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Music in Balance:
The Aesthetics of Music
after Kant, 1790–1810
MATTHEW PRITCHARD
“Formalism” and “the autonomy of art”—few
would dispute the continued importance of these concepts to debates
about musical aesthetics and interpretation. Ever since Joseph Ker-
man’s attack on “formalistic” styles of music analysis and the subse-
quent New Musicological polemics against the autonomy of the
musical work, they have been central to any consideration of how or
to what extent musicologists should approach “the music itself.”1 Yet as
Kerman’s own genealogy of music analysis showed, the stakes in such
debates are at least partly historical, not just abstractly ontological. The
question of music’s relationship to its meanings and contexts is so
powerfully influenced by how we think about the value of music from
the past that we seek assurance—almost compulsively—about the ori-
gins and continuity of our attitudes. We want to know that similar
modes of thought about similar types of value in similar works of music
have maintained a degree of historical coherence up to the present
moment. It seems a priori to make a difference to our sense of aesthetic
legitimacy in the present when we discover how philosophers and
music critics established the status or value of art in their own time.
Among those thinkers regularly invoked to provide such a sense of
legitimacy, none carries as much intellectual weight, and freight, as
Immanuel Kant.
1 Joseph Kerman, “How We Got Into Analysis and How to Get Out,” Critical Inquiry 7
(1980): 311–31; and Susan McClary and Richard Leppert’s Introduction and Janet Wolff’s
Foreword (“The Ideology of Autonomous Art”) to Music and Society: The Politics of Compo-
sition, Performance and Reception (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), xi–xix and
1–12, respectively.
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There are many reasons for Kant’s status in these debates. His aes-
thetic system has long been admired from both sides of the Continental/
analytical divide in philosophy. For G. W. F. Hegel, Kant “spoke the first
rational word on aesthetics,”2 while for Roger Scruton, without the first
part of Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790) “aesthetics would not exist in its
modern form.”3 In hindsight the timing of Kant’s reflections also seems
remarkably apposite. Peter Kivy, for instance, remarks on Kant’s theori-
zation of the judgment of taste in relation to a key phase of canonic
Western concert music:
Is it a coincidence that at the time the aesthetic attitude theory reached
full development, in 1790, the art of pure instrumental music had
reached a position of prominence in the musical world not theretofore
attained? Coincidence or not, the music seems made for the attitude,
the attitude for the music. . . .The aesthetic attitude . . .became the pre-
scriptive code for listening to a kind of music not only ideally suited to
that code but hardly susceptible of full appreciation without it.4
Kant’s aesthetic system is almost certainly the first to include references
to “autonomy” (Autonomie), and has often been described as “formalist.”
On the former point, Lydia Goehr, perhaps the most influential recent
genealogist of music aesthetics, identifies Kant’s Critique of Judgment as
one of the most powerful articulations of what she calls the “separability
principle” in aesthetics, according to which “at the end of the eighteenth
century, it became the custom to speak of the arts as separated com-
pletely from the world of the . . . everyday.”5 Kant’s descriptions of the
“pure” judgment of taste “helped sever the age-old connection between
the arts and their purported external utilities, and that helped guarantee
the fine arts their autonomy.”6 Romanticism’s rapidly institutionalized
veneration of the musical “work concept” was merely a practical conse-
quence of the philosophical division Kant had already performed. Echo-
ing Goehr, Richard Taruskin concludes:
Kant’s categories are still the ones normally invoked when artworks are
defined or ranked as autonomous. You know the drill: they must be
disinterested both in their motivation and in the mode of their
2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen u¨ber die Geschichte der Philosophie, in
Sa¨mtliche Werke (Stuttgart: 1927–), 19: 601, quoted in Helmut Kuhn and Katharine Everett
Gilbert, A History of Esthetics, rev. ed. (New York: Dover, 1972 [1939]), 321.
3 Roger Scruton, Kant: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1982), 79.
4 Peter Kivy, New Essays on Musical Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001),
54–55.
5 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of
Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 157.
6 Goehr, Imaginary Museum, 169.
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contemplation, they must have the appearance of purposiveness (Zweck-
ma¨bigkeit) without having an actual purpose (Zweck) or socially sanc-
tioned function. These are the criteria that have come under heaviest
attack for the way in which they have seemed to divorce art from social
concerns.7
Whatever Kant may have thought about music personally, as a philosoph-
ical move his definitions of aesthetic judgment seem perfectly designed
to secure for it both autonomy and, anticipatorily, a status it would come
to occupy fully within the aesthetics of Romanticism: a pure, conceptless,
and functionless realm of tones, the ultimate embodiment of “art for
art’s sake.”
So much for autonomy. What about formalism in Kant’s thought
and its relationship to music? According to a recent encyclopedia defi-
nition, “form” is “the perceptual elements of an artwork and . . . the
relationships holding between them,” with “formalism nam[in]g the
aesthetic doctrine in which these related (formal) elements are said to
be the primary locus of aesthetic value.”8 If we take this definition as our
point of reference, there is indeed a sense in which Kant’s aesthetics is
“formalist.” Section 13 of the Critique of Judgment tells us plainly (albeit
parenthetically) that “beauty should actually concern only form.”9 Lee
Rothfarb’s uniquely detailed panorama of nineteenth-century formalist
music aesthetics situates Kant as the “stimulus and point of departure for
the growth of formalism in the nineteenth century.”10
Yet problems for a robustly formalist interpretation of Kant’s aes-
thetics of music emerge in Rothfarb’s discussion. Not the least of these
is the extent of Kant’s authority when it comes to music. Rothfarb
deplores Kant’s “lack [of] training and insight. . . . Surely musical for-
malism requires a more suitable originator than a philosopher who
likens the effects of music to the undesired, spreading fragrance of
a perfumed handkerchief waved about at social gatherings and to the
‘feeling of health produced by intestinal agitation.’”11 On Kant’s
7 Richard Taruskin, “Is There a Baby in the Bathwater?,” Archiv fu¨r Musikwissenschaft
63 (2006): 163–85, at 164.
8 Lucian Krukowski, “Formalism: Conceptual and Historical Overview,” in Encyclope-
dia of Aesthetics, ed. Michael Kelly (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 2:213.
9 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1987), 69 (henceforth CoJ), orig. pub. as Kritik der Urteilskraft, in Gesammelte Schriften, ed.
Ko¨niglisch Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaft (¼Akademie-Ausgabe), vol. 5 (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter, 1912–13), 223 (henceforth KdU); in what follows all page references to
the German original are to the Akademie Ausgabe, vol. 5, page numbers for which are
given in the margin of Pluhar’s translation as well as in most reputable modern German
editions, e.g., Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed. Heiner F. Klemme (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2001).
10 Lee Rothfarb, “Nineteenth-Century Fortunes of Musical Formalism,” Journal of
Music Theory 55 (2011): 167–220, at 176.
11 Ibid., 174–75.
pritchard
41
conclusion that music is “more a matter of enjoyment than culture” and
“like any enjoyment, it needs to be changed fairly often . . . [lest it]
mak[e] us weary,” Rothfarb remarks despondently that when it came
to music, “Kant’s sensibilities—not to mention understanding—were
regrettably limited.”12
While such remarks need not undermine the more general philo-
sophical definitions of beauty and taste that Kant’s Critique of Judgment so
carefully lays out, they do prompt a question that will be fundamental to
this essay: how should such definitions be applied? If aesthetic concepts
are to function in what Goehr (herself following Kant) has called
a “regulative” sense, guiding musical behavior and ideals for the particu-
lar culture of music in which they are valid,13 then such regulation cannot
occur without the mediation of concepts and practices—the translation of
abstract, generalized philosophical theses into statements, whether
descriptive or prescriptive, about musical values and processes, and the
subsequent exemplification of those statements in particular works, gen-
res, styles of performance, and modes of listening. The latter phases of
mediation will not be discussed in this article, which does not address the
ultimate consequences of Kant’s aesthetic theories for musical practice.
Nevertheless there is plenty to be said about the initial stages of the
application of his thought, both in his own reflections on artistic genres
and media (not limited to, and indeed not as limited as, his statements
on music), and in how they were taken up by musically engaged aesthe-
ticians and critics between 1790 and 1810. Indeed the dichotomy of the
“pure” and the “applied” (or “dependent”) was itself one of Kant’s most
fundamental conceptual legacies to music-critical discourse in the first
decades after the publication of the Critique of Judgment.
We thus need, rather urgently, to move beyond taking note of appar-
ent formal homologies or correspondences—what Kivy described as
“coincidences (or not)”—and advance a more historically grounded
account of how Kant’s transformation of philosophical aesthetics
affected his contemporaries’ views on music, as well as to classify or
evaluate these effects. On the question of evaluation in particular, we
should beware of seeking too simple a correlation between past discourse
about music’s value and the music of the past that we find valuable today.
It is all too easy to take the ideas of Kant, or for that matter a critic such as
E. T. A. Hoffmann, as an “explanation” for or vindication of the instru-
mental music of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven. Even at the apex of
a key creative period within the Western art music canon, we should not
disregard the presence of critical voices—writers who were not blind to
12 Ibid., 175n20.
13 Goehr, Imaginary Museum, 101–6.
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what was being achieved around them, but whose moderated or differ-
ently articulated appreciation of contemporary instrumental music
demonstrates their commitment to priorities other than the “purely”
aesthetic. The dynamism of music-aesthetic thought during this era
indeed owes partly to an orientation not simply to works of the present
but also of the past (via the genesis of musical historicism) and the future
(manifested through speculative theories of a future German opera that
would bear fruit only in the decades to come).
To gain a sense of the context from which Kantian music aesthetics
emerged, we should start with Kant’s own philosophical aims, which
could be summarized as attempting a new, synthetic account of experi-
ence. The connection between experience and judgment was not only
crucial to Kant’s aesthetics but can be seen as fundamental to the whole
system outlined by his three Critiques—the Critique of Pure Reason (1781),
the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and the Critique of Judgment
(1790)—as well as to the tradition of German Idealism that emerged
from them. Kant’s philosophy steered a carefully charted course between
two competing contemporary schools of thought: rationalism, exempli-
fied by Rene´ Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and (most relevantly
to Kant’s specific context) the German academic philosopher Christian
Wolff; and empiricism, championed by British philosophers such as John
Locke and David Hume. Kant’s early commitment to rationalism was
famously upset by his reading of Hume, whose systematic skepticism
“woke me from my dogmatic slumbers,” as Kant would later put it.14
Yet Kant did not simply abandon the rationalist belief that the most
important elements of our knowledge could be worked out a priori from
first principles, and uncritically embrace the characteristic empiricist
commitment to sensory experience. Rather, his insight in the Critique of
Pure Reason was that experience itself could only be converted into knowl-
edge through the aid of pre-existing “categories” of thought. Our mind
was not, as Locke had posited, a blank slate or tabula rasa, but it consis-
tently applied a priori ordering principles—such as the assumption of
causality, or the distinction between an object and its properties—to the
phenomena it encountered. Analogously, when it came to the sphere of
morality and religion, or “practical reason,” the choice did not have to be
between, on the one hand, an empiricist, Humean skepticism as to
whether God or a soul existed (or even as to whether human beings were
capable of acting rationally) and, on the other, the rationalist project of
demonstrating the existence of such entities a priori, together with all the
moral principles they customarily implied. Instead one could—as Hume
had dared and the rationalists had not—put the human being front and
14 Kant, Prologomena zu einer jeden ku¨nftigen Metaphysik, in Akademie-Ausgabe, 4:260.
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center in moral philosophy, while tethering human “freedom” to tenta-
tively (or “transcendentally”) posited “Ideas” of moral Reason—ideas
which, however, could not be definitively proven, God included.
This “transcendental method,” as Helmut Kuhn wrote, “resembles
the method of an eclecticism,” taking up elements scattered across the
contemporary philosophical scene, but was “actually less eclectic than it
was irenic”: through it Kant sought to create an “enduring intellectual
peace” between the warring claims of logic and experience.15 Yet a con-
tradiction loomed within Kant’s own philosophy—what Kant himself
called an “immense gulf” between the two spheres of human activity
represented by his first two Critiques.16 One produced an outward-
directed, scientific knowledge that saw the physical universe in terms
of unbroken chains of causation and necessity, while the other valued
an inner principle—our freedom to act morally—that seemed inevitably
to refuse such explanations. How could the inner and the outer, the
sensuously perceptible and the morally just, be reconciled? An important
part of Kant’s answer, which was to dominate subsequent Romantic and
Idealist philosophy, was to locate that reconciliation in aesthetics and
art. Crucially for Kant, these are not the same: aesthetics is not merely
a “theory of art,” for much of the first part of the Third Critique is
concerned with the attribution of beauty to natural phenomena. In
exploring the application of Kant’s aesthetic theory it is important to
understand the difference.
The “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,” which forms the first (and
most commonly read) part of the Third Critique, begins by striking
another balance between rationalism and empiricism, this time regard-
ing the function of judgments of taste. They are neither merely empirical
and subjective reactions of pleasure or displeasure, as Hume claimed,17
nor are they truly a kind of knowledge, albeit one more “confused” than
full intellectual knowledge, as the founder of aesthetics, Alexander
Baumgarten, proposed under the influence of Wolffian rationalism.
Rather, judgments of taste fall short of knowledge by evading the appli-
cation of cognitive categories, instead reacting to a formal “harmony” of
sensations provoked by their object. Although subjectively experienced,
aesthetic judgments are implicitly generalized to the experience of all
human subjects, who (so the one passing judgment expects) “ought” to
judge likewise. In this sense aesthetic judgments share something with
the form of moral judgments (which should also be “universalizable” in
15 Gilbert and Kuhn, History of Esthetics, 326–27.
16 CoJ, 14/KdU, 175.
17 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1888), 299: “Beauty is nothing but a form, which conveys pleasure, as deformity is
a structure of parts, which conveys pain.”
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Kant’s view), while taking as their content the same sensuous realm of
experience as scientific knowledge. They serve, therefore, as a bridge over
the “gulf.” Such a bridge would remain merely formal or theoretical were
it not possible for art to allow us to realize it creatively. Art actually trans-
lates “Ideas” of moral reason into symbols that we appreciate sensuously.
In so doing, it brings into play all the subjective capacities—imagination,
genius, and creativity in the expression of inner experience—that artists
and theorists of art in the Romantic and Idealist traditions would
continue to value for the next century and more.
These traditions were brought together under the heading of the
“aesthetics of experience” (Erlebnisa¨sthetik) by one of the leading inter-
preters, and critics, of Kantian aesthetics in the twentieth century: Hans-
Georg Gadamer. Gadamer’s reading of Kant, now more than half a cen-
tury old, remains worthy of study in that it forms the basis for one of the
key arguments of Truth andMethod (1960), his philosophical masterwork.
The book’s initial aim was to overthrow the lingering nineteenth-century
tradition of Erlebnisa¨sthetik that had been rooted, according to Gadamer,
in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. In addition to the formidable depth of
philosophical understanding evident throughout Gadamer’s text, it is
precisely the revisionist aspect of his critical genealogy for epigonal late-
Romantic aesthetic attitudes that should command our attention. In
order for Gadamer to lay bare and dismantle the Kantian paradigm,
he needed to, and did, know his “enemy” very well indeed.
Yet in situating Kant’s Critique of Judgment as the point of departure
for Erlebnisa¨sthetik, Gadamer produces a reading that is at odds with
current assessments of Kant’s aesthetic significance, such as those of
Goehr and Taruskin cited above, which tend to de-emphasize the impor-
tance of temporal or socio-cultural context in his thought, as well as in its
consequences. When we turn to the application of Kant’s concepts of
“form” and “autonomy,” as traced by Gadamer, it becomes evident that
Kant never intended to put forward the formal autonomy of aesthetic
judgment as key to the arts, or to his defense of the dignity and signifi-
cance that art would henceforth possess for modern society. Indeed such
an interpretation could be characterized as a wholesale misreading of
Kant’s argument.
In addition to bringing gains in hermeneutic precision, this re-
reading of Kant also presents aesthetic-genealogical advantages. The
disjunction between the role of art and the essential form of aesthetic
judgment that turns out to be central to Kant’s theory of artistic experi-
ence also grounds his immediate influence, according to Gadamer, over
a body of Romantic aesthetics and criticism stretching more or less
unbroken from 1790 to the mid-twentieth century. By contrast, one of
the weakest aspects of the alternative account of Kant as an artistic
pritchard
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formalist lies in its (often merely suggested) genealogy of twentieth-
century formalism. This weakness is particularly noticeable in the ac-
counts given by analytical philosophers of art. Stephen Davies, for
instance, sees Kant’s “legacy” exemplified primarily in the early years
of the twentieth century, by which point “it was widely held”—as a delayed
result of Kant’s thought, implies Davies—“that aesthetic judgments,
including those made about artworks, involve the adoption of an attitude
of distanced, disinterested attention that requires the bracketing out of
all knowledge or concern with the item’s origin, history, kind, function,
or possible usefulness.”18 With an analytical philosopher’s breezy disre-
gard for historical verisimilitude, Davies is not worried by this gap of
more than a century in the enactment of Kant’s true “legacy.” The gap,
however, is more important than he acknowledges.
Not by chance, Davies’s remarks occur in a discussion of Kant’s
theory of “free” and “dependent” beauty, one of the most famously
“difficult” parts of Kant’s Third Critique, described by Gadamer as
a “particularly dangerous [ho¨chst fatale] doctrine for the understanding
of art.”19 At this crucial moment in the text, Kant begins to pivot from the
characterization of aesthetic judgment in itself to a theorization of the
arts. The difficulty and “danger” of the theory arise from the seemingly
more transcendent descriptions that Kant attaches to the idea of “free”
beauty. For Kant free beauty is the embodiment of “pure” judgments of
taste. It is in “pure” judgments of taste that we apprehend and evaluate
objects solely according to the abstract “harmony” of sensations they
produce in us. This makes it feel as though such an object must have
been designed with a purpose (Zweck) to which all elements of its formal
organization are subordinate, even though any specific and merely util-
itarian purpose is lacking, or at least disregarded in the resulting aes-
thetic judgment. “Pure” aesthetic judgments are based entirely on our
pleasurable response to the object’s formal harmony, not on our con-
ceptual knowledge of what kind of a thing it is and what purpose its
attributes serve. The object for us thus has “purposefulness without
a purpose” (Zweckma¨bigkeit ohne Zweck), and our judgment of it possesses
aesthetic autonomy (Autonomie).20 These characterizations—in particu-
lar adjectives such as “free” and “pure”—might give us the impression
that Kant is ascribing an absolute philosophical pre-eminence to free
18 Stephen Davies, “Aesthetic Judgements, Artworks and Functional Beauty,” Philo-
sophical Quarterly 56 (2006): 224–241, at 226.
19 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G.
Marshall (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 41 (henceforth TM), orig. pub. as Wahr-
heit und Methode: Grundzu¨ge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, 2nd ed. (Tu¨bingen: J. C. B.
Mohr, 1965), 42 (henceforth WM).
20 CoJ, 224/KdU, 350.
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beauty over “dependent” beauty, whose appreciation involves a more
mixed type of judgment.
This impression is misleading. In the context of Kant’s aesthetic
theory as a whole, “free beauty” encompasses, first and foremost, natural
beauty and the decorative or formal arts (Kant’s examples range from
flowers and the arabesques of Persian carpets to music “without a theme”
or “without text”), whereas the justification of the beauty of the other
fine arts, including poetry and figurative painting or sculpture, must
appeal instead to “applied” or “impure” judgments of taste, which take
concepts and purposes into account. Hence, fine arts such as poetry
appear inferior to nature or the decorative arts in terms of the type of
judgment they naturally provoke, at least according to the value-
associations that adjectives such as “pure” seem to carry. As Gadamer
puts it, in this reading “true beauty would be the beauty of flowers and
of ornament, which in our world, dominated by ends, present themselves
as beauties immediately and of themselves, and hence do not necessitate
that any concept or purpose first be consciously disregarded.”21
This would be somewhat counterintuitive; as Gadamer says, it does
not reflect the goal of Kant’s theorizing. Rather, the considerations of
purpose that rule out certain types of formal beauty as inappropriate—
and here Kant presents as examples inappropriately florid architectural
details on a church facade and tattoos (which he regards as the improper
application of formally beautiful ornamental patterns to the human
body)—are a desirable and necessary part of the theory of art, even though
they interrupt our purely aesthetic pleasure in beautiful forms.22 It is
here, observes Denis Dutton (one of the few analytical aestheticians of
recent decades with a genuine appreciation for Kant’s dual concept of
beauty), that the relationship of beauty to its environment becomes
“more problematic and rich, embodying, as Kant reminds us, vanity and
corruption, but radiant exaltation as well. . . .The concept of a bare, self-
subsistent beauty is ultimately lost in the infinite complexities of art’s
dependence on its human context.”23
The point of isolating the “judgment of taste” in its “pure” form is
not to uphold “free beauty” as the highest sort of beauty, let alone as the
aim of art. Rather, Kant proceeds as he does because of the need to
outline with due care his position within the aesthetic debates of the
21 TM, 42, translation altered slightly with reference to WM, 43.
22 CoJ, 77/KdU, 230; cf. TM, 42/WM, 43.
23 Denis Dutton, “Kant and the Conditions of Artistic Beauty,” British Journal of Aes-
thetics 34 (1994): 226–239, at 239. See also Helmut Kuhn’s similar judgment (Kuhn and
Gilbert, History of Esthetics, 338) of “how thin this [Kantian principle of ‘purposiveness
without a purpose’] forces pure beauty to be,” and the comparative “gain in richness” or
“greater magnitude and importance” of the experience of adherent beauty.
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period, specifically, his critique of Wolffian aesthetic rationalism, as
represented by Baumgarten. The “pure” judgment of taste is a hypothet-
ical ideal, almost a thought experiment, intended to prove that taste in
its pure form cannot be cognitive; its substantial basis is feeling in
response to form, rather than (as Baumgarten and the rationalists
assumed) the cognitive assessment of “perfection” or, in scholastic terms,
the “adequacy” of something to its concept. Kant does not wish to remain
limited by the terms of this thought experiment for the entire duration
of his treatise, however. Rather, “pure” aesthetic judgment reveals itself
as incomplete, as requiring amoremixed judgment that includes amoral
or extra-aesthetic component to engage the full measure of our receptive
powers, our imagination in particular. As Gadamer proposes: “This imag-
inative productivity is not richest where it is merely free, however, as in
the convolutions of the arabesque,” but where a concept exists for the
object of our contemplation, without thereby exhausting the object’s
potential to engage us.24 This balance of determination and non-
determination is the “ideal of beauty” (Ideal der Scho¨nheit),25 and it is the
token of Kant’s debt to the classicism of J. J. Winckelmann and G. E.
Lessing that he finds this exemplified to the highest degree in the
human form.26
The beauty of the human marks the transition in Kant’s theory from
the account of our purely sensuous engagement with beauty to our aware-
ness of its higher possibilities, including the specific worth of artworks.
This transition also carries the argument away from free beauty, which, as
Dutton notes, “virtually drops from sight” in the later sections of the
“Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,” and toward an elaboration of
“dependent” beauty.27 The appearance of a human being corresponds
to a definite concept, as an arabesque does not; but it also has the capacity
to express “moral attributes,” which transcend concepts. The difference
between a house, or a cow, and a person is that the beholder has only
a cognitive concept of the first two, one sufficient to enable their insertion
into a certain category in an outer picture of the world; the last, however,
stimulates a transcendental awareness (Vernunft) of the inner moral and
spiritual universe shared by the beholder and the person beheld.
In sum, that is why we can gaze longer into the eyes of another
human than into the eyes of a cat. The paradigm of the “ideal of beauty”
is human precisely because the human is more than purely “natural” or
exterior—its outer appearance suggests inner content. In this respect it
resembles art, whose task must also be to represent the realm of inner or
24 TM, 43/WM, 43.
25 CoJ, 79/KdU, 231.
26 TM, 44/WM, 44.
27 Dutton, “Kant and the Conditions of Artistic Beauty,” 238.
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“moral” ideas. Kant believes, as Hegel would later put it, that the essence
of art is to “confront the human being with himself”—a notion that
would remain significant to later Idealist thinkers down to Benedetto
Croce, even when (like Hegel) they ceased to believe that art could play
the key role in such self-reflection.28 For Kant, other kinds of art, such as
landscape painting, can borrow “moral ideas” through a process of pro-
jection or anthropomorphism, but only in the human form are moral
ideas and aesthetic content completely congruent.29 Kant’s position on
art is not aesthetic formalism, but aesthetic humanism.
This might still suggest a rather limited conception of the kinds of
artworks that could fulfill Kant’s requirements for the representation of
“ideas”—principally sculpture busts and portraits, one imagines. But this
apparent limitation neglects the transformation of mimesis or artistic
representation that occurs when Kant identifies the “moral,” inner, or
transcendental aspects of human beings as more profoundly deserving of
representation than their outer appearance. Such aspects can be best
approached through analogies or other imaginative channels to which,
as Kant’s disciple Schiller would later claim, poetry has more direct access
than the visual arts.30 The starting point for a deeper theory of mimesis,
this inwardness produces Kant’s notorious category of “aesthetic ideas”:
objects of representation that are neither real objects nor concepts and
thus exceed both realism and allegory. There is no technique for suc-
cessfully portraying aesthetic ideas; they can only be conveyed through
genius, the highest human capacity called on by art.31
The relative status of the arts is dependent on the scope and sup-
port they provide for genius in its penetration into the inner realm of
aesthetic ideas; it does not depend on the outer scaffolding of realistic
images or concepts. This is why Kant announces at the beginning of his
“Comparison of the relative aesthetic value of the fine arts” (Critique of
Judgment, §53): “Among all [the arts], poetry (which owes its birth
almost entirely to genius and is the least guided by prescriptions or
examples) claims the highest rank.”32 In this judgment Kant was hardly
original, but he was consistent. The worth of poetry, as the “highest” of
the arts, rests neither on its formal composition nor on its aesthetic
autonomy, but on its ability to create and exhibit beauty as what Kant
28 TM, 45/WM, 45, cited in Hegel, Vorlesungen u¨ber A¨sthetik, 57.
29 TM, 45/WM, 45.
30 Schiller, “Rezension der Gedichte Matthisons,” Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung 298
(1794): cols. 665–80 at col. 671. “The plastic artist makes the outer man into his object, the
poet the inner man.”
31 CoJ, 182–85/KdU, 314–16; cf. TM, 48–49/WM, 49.
32 CoJ, 196/KdU, 326.
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calls, in the final pages of the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,” a “symbol
of morality” (Symbol der Sittlichkeit).33
Pace Davies, judging artworks in Kant’s view is typically a matter of
knowing something about their “origin . . . , kind, function, or possible
usefulness.”34 Concepts such as Zweck, Begriff, and Idee, which form part of
the reception of “dependent beauty,” collectively embrace all these ca-
tegories and more. (I have left “history” out of Davies’s original list, but
the historical dimension in artistic judgment will return in my discussion
of Kantian music journalism.) Highlighting this point’s significance in
relation to the value of music, Andy Hamilton correctly perceives that
Kant is not truly a formalist aesthetician; he is rather “an anti-formalist
about many artforms other than instrumental music. . . .Kant is a formal-
ist about music [only] because he denigrates the art as a free artificial
beauty which lacks aesthetic ideas.”35
Still more precisely, what matters in understanding the application
of Kant’s doctrine of “free” and “dependent” beauty to music is that even
in Kant’s own theory, music itself cannot wholly be assigned to one
category or the other. Kant mentions “what in music are called fantasias
(without a theme)” as potential embodiments of “free beauty” but im-
plies that, or leaves it for us to decide whether, other genres might
require more “dependent” judgments.36 Far from being a failure of his
system, this indecision is a fertile point of ambiguity. It is both an honest
acknowledgment of his own limits as a musical connoisseur (q.v. Roth-
farb) and an invitation to the extension and application of his aesthetic
theory within criticism.
In the decade after Kant’s Third Critique, this invitation was taken up
by three music critics: Kant’s friend J. F. Reichardt, described with some
justification by Helmut Kirchmeyer as “to all intents the first Kantian
music journalist”;37 the anonymous author of the article series “Remarks
on the Development of the Art of Music in Germany in the Eighteenth
Century,” published in the Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung; and the erst-
while philosophy lecturer C. F. Michaelis, another prolific contributor to
the same journal. Of particular interest in these writings is how Kantian
innovations such as the distinction between free and dependent beauty
relativize musical autonomy and “formalist” aesthetic values, allowing
them a carefully delimited role in a larger critical system whose ultimate
concerns are often social, historical, or political. Judgments of free and
33 CoJ, 225–30/KdU, 351–54.
34 Davies, “Aesthetic Judgements, Artworks and Functional Beauty,” 226.
35 Andy Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music (London: Continuum, 2007), 72.
36 CoJ, 77/KdU, 229.
37 Helmut Kirchmeyer, Situationsgeschichte der Musikkritik und des musikalischen Pres-
sewesens in Deutschland, II. Teil: System- und Methodengeschichte (Regensburg: Bosse, 1985), xvi.
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dependent beauty relate to particular types of work (categorized in terms
of vocal or instrumental music, church music, opera, song, and other
genres, or in terms of historical style). They demand differing levels of
critical expertise. They could also be applied within differing schools of
aesthetics and criticism. Kantian aesthetics, certainly in its application by
Schiller and his successors, is normally thought of as classical as well as
Idealist. Yet given the rise of Romantic aesthetics in both music and
literature from the 1790s on, tracing the continuing influence of Kant’s
ideas also involves understanding how they were (re)interpreted from
a Romantic standpoint.
Kant’s friend and fellow Ko¨nigsberger, J. F. Reichardt, was one of the
most important North German composers of the late-eighteenth century
and one of the most prolific critics of the period. As his biographer
Walter Salmen describes him, Reichardt “was not a musician afraid of
talking or writing about art and about his own composing; on the con-
trary, he demanded on principle the increased training of ‘thinking and
researching German musicians,’” a demand gradually satisfied by the
expansion of informed critical engagement with music over his own
lifetime, which laid the groundwork for figures such as Hoffmann, Schu-
mann, and Wagner.38 Dispersed throughout his numerous writings are
reflections on aesthetics, which already to Paul Sieber in 1930, in the
earliest study of Reichardt’s aesthetic views, revealed a fairly consistent
attitude.39 Its foundations are “sentimentalist,” part of a new wave of
Empfindsamkeit across the arts. In resisting the music-theory-oriented and
highly professionalized critical standards that had set the tone for the
new music criticism of the mid-eighteenth century, Reichardt appealed
to “feeling” (Gefu¨hl ), taste, and genius rather than to “correctness” or the
satisfaction of rules. Mary Sue Morrow adduces a 1783 judgment on
Reichardt’s critical style that demonstrates traditional critics’ objections
to such a reliance on “feeling”: “references to his [Reichardt’s] own
feelings simply do not help when he is discussing musical works, because
the reader cannot possibly experience those feelings in the same way.”40
This skepticism toward critical subjectivity and the possibility of a sen-
sus communis hints at a clear distance from Kantian principles. By con-
trast, in Reichardt’s argument “feeling” forms a true, if still incomplete,
part of the process of aesthetic judgment as described by Kant, which
38 Walter Salmen, Johann Friedrich Reichardt: Komponist, Schriftsteller, Kapellmeister und
Verwaltungsbeamter der Goethezeit, 2nd ed. (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2002), 189.
39 Paul Sieber, Johann Friedrich Reichardt als Musika¨sthetiker: Seine Anschauungen u¨ber
Wesen und Wirkung der Musik (Baden-Baden: Valentin Koerner, 1971 [1930]).
40 Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek 53 (1783), 142, quoted in Morrow, German Music Crit-
icism in the Late Eighteenth Century: Aesthetic Issues in Instrumental Music (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1997), 24.
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must begin from the individual’s felt response to an object. As Sieber
summarizes, “feeling has for Reichardt primacy among the ‘faculties of
the soul’. . . . Feeling also passes judgment, according to Reichardt, on
what is beautiful and what is not beautiful.”41 Yet as Salmen points out in
his biography, Reichardt “stayed aloof from such extreme . . .demands
and one-sided [formulations]” as Rousseau’s aphorism, “sentiment is
[worth] more than reason”: “feeling” has priority for Reichardt, but it
is not made absolute, since it typically requires “reflection and experi-
ence” to temper it.42 Reichardt’s approach thus possessed an inherent
degree of compatibility with Kant’s.
It is not surprising to learn, then, that Reichardt was so enthused by
Kant’s support of a similarly non-rationalist philosophy of taste in the
Critique of Judgment that only a year after its publication he announced his
intention to write a systematic tract on music aesthetics that would apply
Kant’s theory.43 Kant seems to have had confidence in his friend’s under-
standing of the framework underlying his aesthetics; in a letter of 15
October 1790, Kant encouraged Reichardt to apply his aesthetic princi-
ples to the arts, no doubt including music: “It would please me if the
principles I have outlined of the power of taste, which is so difficult to
fathom, could take on greater definition and detail in the hands of such
an expert [Kenner] in that power [as yourself].”44
Reichardt never fulfilled his published intention to produce a system-
atic work in aesthetics. In the same breath as the promise, he added
excuses for why it would not be soon forthcoming.45 Yet his failure in
this regard may not have owed primarily to the “limitations of his intel-
lectual powers,” as Salmen rather acidly phrases it, but to what Salmen
more charitably identifies as an intuitive and praxis-oriented tendency:
“where Reichardt can proceed from a concrete example, he speaks
‘clearly and distinctly,’ but where he by contrast speculates without an
intuitive grasp [of the subject], he is often only the translator of bor-
rowed ideas, or instead imprecise and formally unsatisfying.”46
41 Sieber, Reichardt als Musika¨sthetiker, 69.
42 Salmen, Johann Friedrich Reichardt, 193–94, citing Reichardt, “Zweyter Brief, an
Herrn Sch. Kr. in K.” in Briefe eines aufmerksamen Reisenden, die Musik betreffend 1 (1774):
32–63, at 35.
43 J. F. Reichardt, “Fingerzeige fu¨r den denkenden und forschenden deutschen
Tonku¨nstler,” in Musikalisches Kunstmagazin 2 (1791): 87–92, at 87.
44 Kants Briefwechsel (Berlin 1900), 2:213ff., quoted in Salmen, Johann Friedrich Reich-
ardt, 190: “Angenehm wu¨rde es mir seyn, wenn die Grundzu¨ge, die ich von dem so schwer zu
erforschenden Geschmacksvermo¨gen entworfen habe, durch die Hand eines solchen
Kenners desselben, mehrere Bestimmtheit und Ausfu¨hrlichkeit bekommen ko¨nnten.”
45 Reichardt, “Fingerzeige,” 87: “Man erwarte indeß nicht in den na¨chstenMessen ein
solches Werk von mir . . . ich [werde] mir . . . alle Zeit lassen, die die Wichtigkeit und Vol-
lendung eines solchen Werkes erfordert.”
46 Salmen, Johann Friedrich Reichardt, 196n680, 191.
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Reichardt’s critical virtues and eclectic vices are juxtaposed elsewhere
in the same issue of his journal, the Musikalisches Kunstmagazin, in which
he promised to produce his own work of Kantian aesthetics. The front
page featured an extract from the concluding section of Kant’s “Critique
of Aesthetic Judgment,” “On Methodology Concerning Taste,” reaffirm-
ing Kant’s conclusion that “there neither is, nor can be, a science of the
beautiful,” and therefore that “rules” or any other theoretical element in
art must always be subordinated to the “freedom of imagination . . .with-
out which there can be no fine art, indeed not even a correct taste of one’s own
by which to judge such art.”47 Reichardt highlighted the last clause in large
type, a clear barb against his journalistic enemies—or more precisely,
against the enemies of his favorite modern operatic composer, Christoph
Willibald Gluck. In a footnote he explains: this passage “seemed to me to
be well placed here in particular for Gluck’s unqualified critics who lack
imagination”;48 the subsequent essay contains a detailed analysis and
defense of Gluck’s aria “Misero e che faro`?” from the second of his reform
operas, Alceste (1767), introducing further Kantian citations. If a certain
modulation in the aria was too far-flung by textbook standards, it was only
because this “trait belongs perhaps with those which—as Kant puts it so
well—the genius must leave to stand as a deformity only because it could
not be removed without weakening the idea.”49
Reichardt’s simultaneous acceptance of bold infringements of theo-
retical orthodoxy and his support for musical styles simpler than those
upheld by older, anti-reformist Berlin critics (such as J. N. Forkel) derive
from a practical appreciation for all those elements—expressive aims,
generic context, the demands of text, and performance—that nourished
the appreciation of “dependent beauty” as opposed to “free beauty.”
Reichardt was also ready to censor music that showed no awareness of
contextual constraints, in particular sacred music that borrowed indis-
criminately from the style of opera buffa (paralleling Kant’s above-cited
remark on inappropriate architectural ornamentation in churches).50
47 Kant, ed. Reichardt, “Von der Methodenlehre des Geschmacks,” repr. in Musika-
lisches Kunstmagazin 2 (1791): 65 (emphasis Reichardt’s): “Die Freiheit der Einbildung-
skraft . . .ohne welche keine scho¨ne Kunst, selbst nicht einmal ein richtiger sie beurteilender
eigener Geschmack, mo¨glich ist” (cf. CoJ, 230–31/KdU, 354–55).
48 Reichardt, “Von der Methodenlehre,” 65n1: “Diese Stelle schien mir hier be-
sonders fu¨r Glucks unberufene Critiker ohne Einbildungskraft an ihrem rechten Orte zu
stehen.”
49 Reichardt, “Einige Anmerkungen zu den merkwu¨rdigen Stu¨cken großer Meister
im sechsten Stu¨ck des Kunstmagazins,” Musikalisches Kunstmagazin 2 (1791): 66–69, at 67:
“Vielleicht geho¨rt dieser Zug auch zu dem, was—wie Kant so treffend sagt—was das Genie
als Mißgestalt nur hat zulassen mu¨ssen, weil es sich ohne die Idee zu schwa¨chen, nicht wohl
wegschaffen ließ” (cf. CoJ, 187/KdU, 318).
50 James Garratt, Palestrina and the German Romantic Imagination: Interpreting Historicism
in Nineteenth-Century Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 37.
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Yet even “free beauty,” without text, representation, or expressive goals,
belonged to Reichardt’s range of appreciation—in the right context:
Music is already by itself, as music, a delight, without it imitating feelings
and passions. It may not make us sad, happy, or astonished, at all, and
yet can tickle our ear in a charming fashion simply through a pleasant
miscellany of tones, so that we are delighted. Furthermore it can occupy
our intellect through the varied and contrived relationships of tones to
one another, through their entanglement and resolution, and thus
delight us in a noble manner. Finally it can combine the two. This is
the reason why instrumental music alone, even when it does not express
a definite emotion, can still give us pleasure. It is also the reason why the
amateur [Liebhaber] is charmed by the instrumental music of the Mann-
heim school that tickles the ear pleasantly, and the learned connoisseur
[Kenner] is pleased by the so-called Berlin style that occupies the intel-
lect; and why the careful combination of the two grants to the genuine,
sensitive connoisseur the highest delight of which instrumental music is
capable.51
The difference from the French operatic pamphlet wars of mid-century,
in which critical absolutes abounded (e.g., Diderot’s unchained expres-
sivity against the dignity of Lullian declamation or Rousseau’s primacy of
melody versus Rameau’s insistence on harmony), is palpable. Only a phil-
osophical position such as Kant’s that refused to endorse either a crudely
empirical sensualism or an abstract, rule-bound cognitivism could in the
final analysis hold music in the balance.
It remained for other, more systematic thinkers than Reichardt to
draw explicitly on Kant’s free and dependent beauty, not merely in
a dualistic fashion but in order to explore characteristic mixtures of the
two categories. This occurred in a long, serially published article of 1801
for the Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung (AmZ) titled “Remarks on the
Development of the Art of Music in Germany in the Eighteenth Cen-
tury.” The article’s author has traditionally been identified as J. K. F.
51 Reichardt, “Neue merkwu¨rdige musikalische Werke”, Musikalisches Kunstmagazin
1 (1782): 69–87, at 84: “DieMusik ist an sich selbst schon als Musik eine Ergo¨tzung, ohne dass
sie Empfindungen und Leidenschaften nachahmt. Sie darf uns eben nicht traurig, lustig,
und Erstaunen machen, und kann doch durch ein blosses angenehmes Gemisch von To¨nen
unser Ohr auf eine liebliche Art ku¨tzeln, dass wir ergo¨tzt werden. Sie kann ferner durch ihre
mannigfaltige und ku¨nstliche Verha¨ltnisse der To¨ne untereinander, durch die Verwickelung
und Auflo¨sung derselben, auf eine angenehme Art unsern Verstand bescha¨ftigen und uns
dadurch auf eine edle Art ergo¨tzen. Endlich kann sie beides verbinden. Diss [sic] ist die
Ursache, warum wir an blosser Instrumentalmusik, die auch keine bestimmte Leidenschaft
ausdru¨ckt, dennoch Vergnu¨gen finden. Diss ist auch die Ursache, dass Mannheimer
Instrumentalmusik, die das Ohr angenehm ku¨tzelt, dem blossen Liebhaber vorzu¨glich
gefa¨llt, dass sogenannte Berlinische Musik, die den Verstand bescha¨fftigt, dem gelehrten
Kenner vorzu¨glich gefa¨llt; und dass vernu¨nftige Verbindung von beiden, dem billigen und
gefu¨hlvollen Kenner die ho¨chste Ergo¨tzung bei der Instrumentalmusik gewa¨hrt.”
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Triest, but the attribution has been questioned by Christoph Ha¨nggi (to
facilitate easier reading I will continue to use Triest’s surname, and the
reader can supply the implied inverted commas).52 In Triest’s essay
the distinction between “pure” and “dependent” judgements of taste
becomes an opposition between “pure” and “applied” music. Impor-
tantly, this is not the same as the distinction between instrumental and
vocal music, though those two categories are also frequently invoked. As
Triest explains near the outset of his essay, historically,
every fine art (including music) had a dual definition. It was partly pure
art (existing for itself), the transformation of sensual material into the
free and beautiful play of the imagination; and partly (in keeping with
its empirical origins) it was only an aesthetic means to other ends,
especially the more beautiful portrayal of one or several individual
subjects (their feelings and actions), in which case it was applied art.53
Carl Dahlhaus points out that Triest’s “dichotomy . . . rests . . .on a contam-
ination of Kant’s distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘dependent’ beauty on
the one hand and the division of ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ mathematics on the
other.”54 Though much instrumental music may be called “pure,” and
opera would certainly count as “applied” music, Triest notes that there
can be a purity—an aspect of “free play”—in choral music where the
formal procedures of counterpoint take priority over attention to the
meaning of the text, whereas “applied music” may include “characteristic”
instrumental pieces, or what would later be called “program” music, com-
posed to portray a specific subject.55
Significant in Triest’s use of this distinction is not just that the con-
cept of music has been split and doubled, but that these two categories
interact in what Triest himself calls an “aesthetic-historical” process. A
later name for it would be “dialectic.” Not only are there no absolute
values, no prioritization of “pure” music over “applied” or vice versa, but
the historical development of one category is shown to depend on the
development of the other. In the early “miracles of art based on the myths
52 Christoph Ha¨nggi points out that both the article “Bemerkungen u¨ber die Aus-
bildung der Tonkunst in Deutschland” and another AmZ article it mentions as by the
same author are printed anonymously, and that Triest’s name was most likely printed by
mistake, or in the wrong place, in the journal’s Autorenregister for that year. To date this has
been the sole source of the attribution: see G. L. P. Sievers und seine Schriften: Eine Geschichte
der romantischen Musika¨sthetik (Bern: Peter Lang, 1993), 129–30.
53 Johann Karl Friedrich Triest, trans. Susan Gillespie, “Remarks on the Development
of the Art of Music in Germany in the Eighteenth Century,” in Haydn and His World, ed.
Elaine Sisman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 321–94, at 324.
54 Carl Dahlhaus, “Zur Entstehung der romantischen Bach-Deutung,” in Klassische
und romantische Musika¨sthetik (Laaber: Laaber-Verlag, 1988), 121–40, at 129.
55 Triest, “Remarks,” 387n1.
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of Antiquity” (i.e., Greek drama) music “had value . . .only as an applied
art,” and “quite a long time was required before it began to be practiced as
a pure art . . .without reference to a text.” For pure music to acquire value,
music would have to develop its technical side, or what Triest calls its
“mechanism,” and it “would not have done so without the well-known
cultural decline that plunged the sciences and arts into a long night”—
in other words, the Middle Ages. This technical development involved the
invention of harmony and counterpoint, which “did not spring from the
senses, but rather from the understanding [or intellect, Verstand].” Thus
“as a pure art . . . musicmade quite good progress. . . .All ofmusic’s art and
erudition were united in harmony, and a knowledge of counterpoint was
the single and greatest thing . . . [necessary] to attract the admiration of
other artists.”56 German music at the end of the seventeenth century was,
Triest claimed, dominated by the strict technique of “pure” church music.
This would soon change with the advent of the lighter galant style,
represented by a generation of musicians around the middle of the
eighteenth century, still remembered with respect, if categorized as out-
dated, when Triest wrote: Johann Adolf Hasse, Carl Heinrich Graun, and
Georg Benda. Their speciality was opera, or “applied” music, and
through the “more beautiful and graceful shape” they gave German
music, they acquired a more “widespread following” than “could ever
be inspired by an artist whose . . .brilliance shines in pure music.”
Through this development, but also through a number of material fac-
tors such as the development of the musical press and the declining
remuneration of church musicians (Triest’s “ideal” overview does not
preclude attention to economics and technology), theatrical ideals of
tuneful melody, dramatic buoyancy, and ease of communication came
to dominate all areas of musical culture, even music in church (though
Triest clearly disapproves of this).57
Finally, in the third phase of German eighteenth-century musical
history “pure” instrumental music again won the initiative in the exem-
plary works of Haydn. But this more modern instrumental music differed
from that of the early eighteenth century, as is revealed by the Kantian
terms in which Triest describes it. Its “greatest effect” is in mimicking the
“specific feelings and ideas” that are presented by vocal music, stimulat-
ing the listener’s imagination into supplying them. The specificity of
“applied” music is transferred to “pure” music by a union of “mastery
of the tonal mechanism” (covering not only formal skill but expressive
knowledge of the “natural character” of musical materials) with the “free
56 All quotations in this paragraph from Triest, “Remarks,” 323–27.
57 All quotations in this paragraph from ibid., 338–39, 352.
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play” of the listener’s imagination. The “thoroughness of the first peri-
od” was combined with the “songfulness of the second.”58
It is tempting to see this as anticipating a typical triumphalist Hegelian
schema that culminates in the “classical style.” But this does not appear to
be Triest’s view. Triest’s third period is characterized above all by
“fermentation,” not culmination: “it seems to me equally foolish to speak
of the decline of an art per se as to claim that it has reached its loftiest
peak.”59 Nor does the Viennese school acquire its status by restoring the
structural complexity and discipline of Johann Sebastian Bach after the
trough of formulaic superficiality represented by galant composition.
Triest’s avoidance of this twentieth-century cliche´ is worth stressing.60
Although Triest praises Bach in enthusiastic terms as having gone
beyond “everything that Italy, France, and England had done for pure
music” and given “posterity examples [of learned works] that to this day
have not been surpassed,” he “do[es] not claim that J. S. Bach did every-
thing there was to do for music.” For in Triest’s view, not dissimilar to
Reichardt’s, Bach’s “accomplishments really only embrace pure music,
i.e., the mechanism of music, especially harmony and the strict style.”
Rather than discussing his genius in expressive terms, Triest not only
writes of Bach’s bent for musical “inquiry” (rather than invention or
expression), but also refers to his “Newtonian spirit,” his position as “the
legislator of genuine harmony.”61 Bach is closer to being a scientific
genius than an artistic, or “poetic,” genius (in our terms, that is; Kant
for his part denied that genius was possible in science, even for a Newton,
as Triest would presumably have been aware).62
It was the second phase of the century, the generation of Hasse,
Graun, Benda, and particularly C. P. E. Bach, that “made it possible for
music, which until then had been almost only mechanical, to claim to be a fine
art.”63 Absolute command of music’s “mechanism” may make a man of
J. S. Bach’s talents “seem like a magician to whom one tends to ascribe
supernatural powers,” but this command does not produce music in the
fully modern artistic or expressive sense, a music that embodies “aesthetic
ideas.” Only with C. P. E. Bach’s aestheticization and subjectivization of
“pure” instrumental music did the achievements of the late eighteenth
century, of Haydn and Mozart, become possible.
58 Ibid., 369–70.
59 Ibid., 357, 384.
60 Charles Rosen, for instance, cites Triest in support of his conventional interpre-
tation of the eighteenth-century canon; see “From the Troubadours to Sinatra: Part II,”
review of Richard Taruskin, Oxford History of Western Music, in New York Review of Books, 9
March 2006, note 1.
61 Triest, “Remarks,” 334–35.
62 Cf. Kant, CoJ, 176–77/KdU, 308–9.
63 Triest, “Remarks,” 337 (my emphasis).
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Triest thus recognizes that, as Melanie Wald-Fuhrmann has put it,
instrumental music was the “innovatory form par excellence of musical
development” at the time, one that favored German talents.64 Neverthe-
less, there is no concomitant implication that “for Triest instrumental
music appears to be . . . the ‘real’ music,” as Dahlhaus one-sidedly
claimed.65 By positing this, Dahlhaus shows a significant failure to grasp
the ontological intent of Triest’s argument. There is no “real” music for
Triest: no single definition that does justice to all its possibilities, no
priority of instrumental music over vocal music, no elevation of “pure”
art over “applied” art.
On the contrary, Triest is concerned that the one-sided development
of instrumental forms and techniques was causing the neglect of song.
The cultivation of song he says, is “the most important need now con-
fronting the practical art of music for us in Germany,” and he immediately
diagnoses the lack of a culture of song as a symptom both of a pedagogical
failing in German schools and, more importantly, of the “extremely
oppressive” gap between the “lower and higher estates.” (Instrumental
music’s progress had largely been funded, and appreciated, by upper-class
audiences, while the broader-based popularity of lieder was offset by a lack
of artistic prestige.) This was the class structure on which the historical
development of eighteenth-century music had rested, and which had only
been “ameliorated . . . in the last decade of the previous century,” a thinly
disguised reference to the Europe-wide resonances of the French Revo-
lution.66 It is tempting to speculate that the boldness of this political
diagnosis in itself may have mandated the author’s choice to remain
anonymous. What is certain is that in Triest’s assessment there is no space
for political or cultural complacency—though there is ample room,
opened by his “aesthetic-historical” mode of applying Kant, for consider-
ation of the social, political, and historical factors long supposed to have
been excluded by the Kantian aesthetic framework.
The last of our trio of music journalists, publishing both in the
Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung alongside Triest and in Reichardt’s Ber-
linische Musikalische Zeitung, C. F. Michaelis is also the most prolific and
important Kantian aesthetician of music considered here. Occasional
disparaging judgments notwithstanding (such as John Neubauer’s refer-
ence to his “poor attempts at popularization” of Kant),67 modern scho-
lars have seen in Michaelis one of the most significant expressions of
64 Melanie Wald-Fuhrmann, “Ein Mittel wider sich selbst” : Melancholie in der Instrumen-
talmusik um 1800 (Kassel: Ba¨renreiter, 2010), 56.
65 Dahlhaus, “Zur Entstehung der romantischen Bach-Deutung,” 129.
66 Triest, “Remarks,” 378.
67 John Neubauer, The Emancipation of Music from Language: Departures from Mimesis in
Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 191.
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music-aesthetic thinking around the turn of the eighteenth century,
including the era’s Kantianism. Just as with Dahlhaus’s interpretation
of Triest, however, German scholars in the wake of Dahlhaus, such as
Wilhem Seidel and Lothar Schmidt, have also tried retrospectively to
enlist Michaelis in support of “the idea of absolute music.”
In his 1795 essay “On the Spirit of Musical Art, with Reference to
Kant’s Critique of Judgment,” Michaelis would appear to be a reasonably
faithful transcriber of Kant’s music aesthetics, right down to Kant’s neg-
ative assessments of music as more a “pleasant” than a “fine” art.68He was
forced onto the defensive, however, by an attack advanced in the very first
article of the first issue of the Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung by its editor,
Friedrich Rochlitz, who upheld music’s honor as one of the fine arts.69 By
1804, although Michaelis still considers it worth setting down Kant’s view
on music’s aesthetic status, he immediately adds: “this last opinion has
rightly been contested by recent aestheticians. . . .That music bestows the
least culture among the other arts its devotees will not concede so easily to
the philosopher from Ko¨nigsberg, and astute men of recent times have
shown the baselessness of this disparagement of music.”70
According to Schmidt and Seidel, Michaelis’s apparent “turn” of the
early 1800s established music’s fine art status through a radically
increased objectivism that stressed the autonomy of the musical work
and the formal self-sufficiency of instrumental music. For Schmidt, in
the “closely related group . . .of texts from the years 1805 to 1807 . . .
Michaelis goes decisively beyond his [1795] treatise . . . and formulates
his concept of the musical artwork’s ‘autonomously perfected form’ [in
sich vollendeten Form]”; all these essays “have an anchor in the issue of the
conditions of music as a fine art, which is oriented more and more
toward the problem of the nature of musical compositions as works
[Werkcharakter] . . . . In the center of [these] considerations stands . . .
instrumental music.”71 For Seidel, Michaelis stays within the orbit of
Kantian philosophy but tries to overcome its subjectivist tendencies: he
“attempts to do justice, within Kant’s subject-oriented system, to musical-
artistic objects. . . .As great as Michaelis’s respect for Kant’s philosophy is,
for him what matters is the criticism of musical works, not of musical
taste.”72 Finally, claims Seidel,
68 “Ueber den Geist der Tonkunst, mit Ru¨cksicht auf Kants Kritik der a¨sthetischen
Urteilskraft: Ein a¨sthetischer Versuch” (1795), repr. in Christian Friedrich Michaelis, Ueber
den Geist der Tonkunst und andere Schriften, ed. Lothar Schmidt (Chemnitz: Gudrun Schro¨-
der, 1997), 1–70 (henceforth UGT ).
69 Ha¨nggi, G. L. P. Sievers, 115.
70 Michaelis, AmZ 6 (1803/4): 767ff., quoted in Ha¨nggi, G. L. P. Sievers, 127.
71 Schmidt, “Nachwort” to Michaelis, UGT, 302–3.
72 Wilhelm Seidel, “Zwischen Immanuel Kant und der musikalischen Klassik: Die
A¨sthetik des musikalischen Kunstwerks um 1800,” in Das musikalische Kunstwerk: Festschrift
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Michaelis struggles through to the insight . . . that a truly work centered
music only revolves about itself, has no other subject than its musical
theme, and nothing else to do but unfold, develop, and vary this
[theme] according to the laws of organic form. “We do not regard,”
he writes, “the tones of music in most cases as signs, but immediately
enjoy the harmonic play of their variety”. . . .The work . . .must convince
us “by itself, without any further relationship or significance.”73
From Seidel’s quotations alone it would appear difficult to contradict the
argument that Michaelis indeed espouses here a proto-Hanslickian for-
malist aesthetic of “absolute music” and can scarcely have shared the
interpretation of Kant I have furnished above.
Read in context, however, Michaelis’s arguments are not only less
formalist, but more nuanced, relativist, and logically coherent over the
span of his career than Schmidt and Seidel admit. His 1795 treatise is
already original in its interpretation of Kant, and although it repeats his
deprecations of music at some points (thus inviting Rochlitz’s ire), it
challenges them at others. The confusion this causes for modern schol-
arship is evident in Georg Mohr’s assessment of Michaelis’s work.74
While Mohr praises Michaelis’s “progressive” views on the formal auton-
omy of the work, he cannot understand why in other passages Michaelis
invests so heavily in the vocabulary of affect and expression, as if Michae-
lis somehow implies that “music is not about music, but about the correct
manipulation of and sensitivity to affect.” In conclusion Mohr offers only
the limp query: “But what does that have to do with music?” Yet if affec-
tive considerations are included within music and its value, as the Kan-
tian concept of dependent beauty makes possible, then there is no
contradiction here. One only arises through the assumption that Michae-
lis is operating within a twentieth-century formalist aesthetic framework,
based wholly on autonomous judgments of free beauty. In accusing
Michaelis of being “highly unhistorical, uncultural [unkulturell],
and . . .uncritical,” Mohr reveals his own aesthetic prejudices.75
Such difficulties can largely be resolved by positing that Michaelis,
like Triest, has a fully dual conception of music. Music’s formal auton-
omy is only one side of the coin; the other side is its expressive, imagi-
native, and “characteristic” effects. The whole coin has value, not one
side or the other. In chapter 6 of his 1795 treatise, Michaelis gives
-
Carl Dahlhaus zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Hermann Danuser et al. (Laaber: Laaber-Verlag,
1988), 67–84, at 76.
73 Seidel, “Zwischen Immanuel Kant und der musikalischen Klassik,” 79.
74 Georg Mohr, “‘Die Musik ist eine Kunst des “innern Sinnes” und der
“Einbildungskraft”’: Affekt, Form und Reflexion bei Christian Friedrich Michaelis,” in
Musikphilosophie, ed. Ulrich Tadday (Munich: Richard Boorberg Verlag, 2007), 137–51.
75 Mohr, “Affekt, Form und Reflexion,” 150–51.
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a double definition of music: first in light of its “characteristic effects”
(eigenthu¨mlichen Wirkungen), and then in its “inner essence” (inneres We-
sen). From the first point of view, music is defined as “the art of exciting
aesthetic sensations directly, and aesthetic ideas indirectly.”76 Viewed
“from the side of its inner essence,” however, music “consists in modified
presentations of audible nature, fixed in form and material according to
the law of unity in multiplicity”—a view that, if taken by itself and only if
taken by itself, is considerably closer to that of Hanslick as well as of much
twentieth-century aesthetics.77
It is this “inner essence” to which the title of Michaelis’s 1806 essay
explicitly refers: “Ein Versuch, das innere Wesen der Tonkunst zu ent-
wickeln” (An attempt to develop the inner essence of the art of music),
whose more emphatically formalist language Schmidt and Seidel take as
key evidence for Michaelis’s turn away from eighteenth-century psycho-
logical aesthetics. “The traditional justification for music in the aesthetics
of effect is thereby given up,” claims Schmidt.78 Yet Michaelis is not
giving anything up; he is simply re-engraving one side of the coin,
“developing” the idea of music’s inner “system” (another possible, and
perhaps less prejudicial, translation for Wesen) rather than its expressive
significance, which is developed more fully in other essays.
The tone in this essay is not polemical but defensive and relativist.
There are many genres of music whose value does not seem to be fully
accounted for by hearing them according to the aesthetics of expression.
Just after the first sentence quoted by Seidel above, Michaelis writes:
One would have to dismiss pieces of music prized by many people, for
instance, many worthy fugues, if one were always to demand a definite
expression, a meaning. . . .What they certainly should represent, or
allow one to perceive and feel . . . is the beautiful or the sublime, and
the noble, or what results from the union of these; this alone pleases in
and through itself without any further relationship and significance.
Seidel took the second phrase he quoted out of context and attributed it
misleadingly to the musical work. But Michaelis is actually talking about
subjective, if not directly emotional, aesthetic effects (the beautiful, the
sublime, and as in Reichardt’s description of learned instrumental
music, the “noble”). He is thus making a rather different point. Michaelis
continues:
76 UGT, 28.
77 Ibid.
78 Schmidt, “Nachwort,” 310. Bonds has characterized Michaelis’s position more
moderately as “soft formalism” (Absolute Music: The History of an Idea [New York: Oxford
University Press, 2014], 101), but it is unclear why the “formalist” label has to be applied at
all, given Michaelis’s even-handedness in dealing with form and expression.
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Music can do this and also still be characteristic, and its power is then all
the greater. Characteristic, pathos-laden music maintains its great
worth; the more truthful its expression is, the more surely it seizes hold
of our imagination and our hearts. But one may not, I believe, demand
in every music, as something essential, the expression of affects, pas-
sions, and inner moods.79
In other words, different kinds of music require different kinds of aes-
thetic judgment—and before passing judgment, it is necessary to know to
what genre of music a piece belongs. The Kantian concept of dependent
beauty, involving assessments not just of artistic propriety and context but
of the artist’s possible intentions, is fundamental for Michaelis. These
contextual assessments are the core of musical connoisseurship:
Our judgment of musical beauty can . . .be determined in two ways:
either we pay . . .no attention to the inner purpose of a composition,
and judge the music as free, unconditioned beauty, as if it were a beauty
of nature . . . or on the contrary we judge the music according to the
idea of its particular significance, consequently as a particular piece [or
genre] of music. . . .We can thus grant our approval to a musical work
from one perspective and deny it from the other. . . .Wemight concede,
for example, the beauty of a musical work or individual movements and
passages in it; it is just that as funeral music we do not find the compo-
sition beautiful, or that the individual movements and passages are not
beautiful when performed in church. . . .Many disagreements over the
evaluation of works of art and in particular of music can be resolved if
one distinguishes the beautiful in itself from the beautiful of its
kind. . . . Judgments of free beauty . . .presuppose no more than taste,
that is, feeling for beauty in general; but judgments of dependent
beauty (which is true artistic beauty as such) require in addition to taste
also knowledge of the specificity and inner purpose of the object pre-
sented, and at the same time consideration of the idea and intention of
the artist, or, in a word: knowledge of art [Kunstkenntnib]. Hence the
difference between the judgments of mere amateurs and those of true
connoisseurs of music.80
79 UGT, 252: “Man mu¨sste vieler gescha¨tzten Musik, z. B. vielen trefflichen Fugen, das
Urtheil sprechen, wenn man nur stets einen bestimmten Ausdruck, eine Bedeutung, die
sich auf Begriffe bringen liesse, von der Musik verlangen wollte. Was sie allemal darstellen,
oder an ihrer Darstellung wahrnehmen und fu¨hlen lassen soll, ist das Scho¨ne oder das
Erhabene, und das Edle, was aus der vereinigung beider entspringt; allein eben diess gefa¨llt
in und durch sich selbst ohne weitere Beziehung und Bedeutung. Hierbei kann die Musik
immer auch charakteristisch seyn, und ihre Kraft ist dann nur um so ma¨chtiger. Die char-
akteristische pathetische Musik beha¨lt ihren hohen Werth; je wahrhafter ihr Ausdruck ist,
um so sicherer bema¨chtigt sie sich unsrer Einbildungskraft und unsers Herzens. Aber man
darf, glaub’ ich, nicht von jeder Musik den Ausdruck von Affekten, Leidenschaften oder
Gemu¨thsstimmungen als wesentlich verlangen.”
80 UGT, 18–20: “Unser Urtheil u¨ber musikalische Scho¨nheit kann . . . auf doppelte
Weise bestimmt seyn: entweder wir nehmen auf . . . keinen innern Zweck einer Komposition
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The question becomes, then, what kinds of music suppose as their
“inner purpose” a greater attention to and valuation of the music’s form,
and the effects of beauty or sublimity attaching directly to form, rather
than effects mediated by affect or character? Hanslickian aesthetics, the
remarks quoted earlier from Reichardt, or Michaelis’s own mention of
fugues might lead us to think that the paradigm here must be instru-
mental music. But that would be inaccurate. Rather, like Triest’s division
of “pure” and “applied” music, Michaelis—who instead favors an oppo-
sition of “objective” and “subjective” styles—sees the issue historically.
His is an opposition of an earlier (antike), ecclesiastical choral style, in
which “the imagination . . . is under the control of the intellect,” to
a more recent galant, operatic-theatrical style, which “reveals itself more
in the free play of fantasy . . . the presentation and excitement of indi-
vidual feelings. . . . It is more favourable to instrumental than to vocal
music.”81
Michaelis’s dualism was not entirely even-handed, of course. In con-
text, his intention—divergent from, though complementary to, Reich-
ardt’s—was primarily to defend the old, strict style against the
encroachments of the new.82 But this was in the spirit of restoring a bal-
ance—a balance also struck within the best works of recent music, which
for Michaelis meant Haydn and Mozart:
If the old [composers] sometimes went too far and produced, through
their over-extended contrapuntal exactitude in canonic treatments,
something constrained and rigid in their work, something bordering
more on architecture than on free poetry, then some modern compo-
sers in the sentimental, romantic, and humoristic style fall often instead
-
Ru¨cksicht, und beurtheilen die Musik als freie, unbedingt Scho¨nheit, gleichsam als Natur-
scho¨nheit . . .oder wir beurtheilen dagegen die Musik unter dem Begriffe von ihrer be-
stimmten Bedeutung, mithin als ein bestimmtes Tonstu¨ck. . . .Wir ko¨nnen daher einerMusik
von einer Seite unsern Beifall geben, von der andern aber versagen. . . .Wir gestehen z. B. die
Scho¨nheit einer Musik oder einzelner Sa¨tze und Ga¨nge derselben ein; nur als Trauermusik
finden wir die Komposition, nur in einemKirchenstu¨ck angebracht, finden wir die einzelnen
Sa¨tze und Ga¨nge nicht scho¨n. . . .Manche Uneinigkeit in Beurtheilung a¨sthetischer und
insbesonder musikalischer Werke la¨bt sich heben, wenn man das an sich Scho¨ne von dem in
seiner Art Scho¨nen unterscheidet. . . .Die Beurtheilung freier Scho¨nheit . . . setzt nur Gesch-
mack, d.h. schlechthin Gefu¨hl furs Scho¨ne, voraus; aber die Beurtheilung der bedingten
Scho¨nheit (der eigentlichen Kunstscho¨nheit als solcher) erfordert auber dem Geschmack
Kenntnib der Bestimmung, des innern Zwecks des dargestellten Gegenstandes, und zugleich
Ru¨cksicht auf die Idee und Absicht des Ku¨nstlers, mit EinemWort: Kunstkenntnib. Daher die
Verschiedenheit zwischen Urtheilen blober Liebhaber und wirklicher Kenner der Musik.”
81 Michaelis, “U¨ber die Kritik musikalischer Werke, nebst beyla¨ufigen Bemerkungen
u¨ber die letzteren” (1819), in UGT, 284, note.
82 Concert programming practice in this period, we should recall, was dominated by
new rather than old music, as would cease to be the case half a century later; see William
Weber, The Great Transformation of Musical Taste: Concert Programming from Haydn to Brahms
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), ch. 6.
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into the other extreme, whereby their musical works lose the [earlier]
stiff quality but at the same time often all aesthetic poise and compre-
hensibility along with it. Joseph Haydn and Mozart will forever be mod-
els among modern instrumental composers in this respect. . . .We find
in their best works simplicity without monotony, naturalness despite
artifice, expression despite moderation . . . and a power that does not
try to inundate [the listener].83
A classical aesthetic for a classical style, then? There are indeed good
reasons for calling Michaelis a “classical” aesthetic thinker. But it would
be a misrepresentation of his thought to imagine his ideal of music as
rising above history instead of resulting from a hard-won mediation of
the aesthetics of past and present. All composing and all reception of
music occurs in a time and a place, and gives expression to that time
and place:
Even great composers who lived through several changing periods of
taste have more or less followed the spirit of the age [Zeitgeist], and their
more recent works were not very similar . . . to their earlier ones. Thus
does the spirit of a nation, and of all its periods of taste, express itself in
the manner in which its most significant and beloved composers treat
music, and [in the manner in which] they are received by their
audience.84
Finally, Michaelis had to acknowledge that the Zeitgeist of German musi-
cal culture was changing. He himself had absorbed some of the philo-
sophical ideas of the post-Kantian generation, hearing Fichte and
Schiller’s lectures in Jena, and the poetry and philosophy of Jena
Romanticism was leaving its mark everywhere on the critical idiom of
the 1790s and 1800s. As powerful as the new rhetoric of Romanticism
was, however, it did not overpower the overall concern with dualism
83 Michaelis, “Allgemeine a¨sthetische Bemerkungen, auf Musik angewandt” (1817),
in UGT, 269–70: “Sollte aber auch die Alten bisweilen zu weit gegangen sein, und durch
ihre zu weit ausgedehnte harmonische Pu¨nktlichkeit in den kanonischen Behandlungen
ihren Werken mitunter etwas Steifes, Hartes, mehr an Architektur, als an freie Poesie,
Gra¨nzendes gegeben haben, so verfallen dagegen manche moderne Componisten der
sentimentalen, romantischen und humoristischen Art vielleicht zuweilen auf ein andres
Extrem, wodurch die musikalischen Werke zwar das Steife, aber zugleich oft alle a¨sthe-
tische Haltung und Fablichkeit verlieren. Joseph Haydn und Mozart werden unter den
modernen Instrumentalcomponisten in dieser Hinsicht immer musterhaft bleiben. . . .Wir
finden in ihren besten Werken Einfachheit ohne Einfo¨rmigkeit, Natu¨rlichkeit bei aller
Kunst, Ausdruck bei aller Ma¨bigung . . .und Kraft ohne Ueberschwemmung.”
84 Michaelis, “Vermischte Bemerkungen u¨ber Musik” (1806), in UGT, 369: “Grobe
Componisten selbst, welche manche Perioden des wechselnden Geschmacks durchlebten,
haben sich mehr oder weniger nach dem Zeitgeist gefu¨gt, und ihre neuern Werke sehen
den fru¨hern . . .nicht sehr a¨hnlich. So dru¨ckt sich der Geist einer Nation, und jede ihrer
Geschmacksperioden, in der Art und Weise aus, wie ihre bedeutendsten und beliebtesten
Tonku¨nstler die Musik behandeln und von ihrem Publikum aufgenommen werden.”
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and dialectical balance that characterized Kantian thought. In this sense
a fundamental continuity of aesthetic approach is identifiable—one that
leads, arguably, all the way through to E. T. A. Hoffmann at the end of our
chosen period.
One characteristic way in which Kantian thought was redirected
toward Romanticism can be seen in the changing description of
“aesthetic ideas.” In C. F. Ko¨rner’s authentically classical, Schillerian
interpretation, such ideas had a fully “moral” and “beautiful” counter-
part in the concept of character—a suitably ineffable, but definitely
human, essence that could find expression in music (instrumental music
included).85 Character was the inexpressible moral core of human life,
not something heavenly and transcendental. Yet in some of Michaelis’s
descriptions, “aesthetic ideas” in music are paraphrased in a rhetoric that
seems to leave such grounded imagery behind and ascend into a more
elevated realm:
Aesthetic ideas constitute the spirit of music. One can indeed view every
work of fine art as the expression of aesthetic ideas. Aesthetic ideas are
intuitions of the imagination (inner perceptions). . . .A piece of music is
infused with the spirit of aesthetic ideas when the energy and charac-
terization of [its] harmony and melody awaken unnameable feelings
and imaginative intuitions in us, and carry us up, as it were, into a tran-
scendental [u¨berirdische] sphere.86
Likewise, in linking aesthetic ideas to “poetry,” as he does elsewhere,
Michaelis repeats a Kantian theme. At the same time, by stressing the
characteristically Romantic or (as he simply but indicatively terms them)
“recent” ideas of “infinity” and the sublime, and by propounding the idea
that any artistic expression of these is not only thereby “poetic” in itself
but demands to be described through poetic language (as Schlegel put
it, “poetry can only be criticized through poetry”), Michaelis’s move
toward a Romantic position, and its attendant critical idiom, is evident:
Recently the explanation has been put forward of beauty as the repre-
sentation of the infinite in the finite, and it is precisely this infinity
which is that marvelous higher principle of life constituting the true
soul of all spirited [geistvoll] music, but existing above all concepts and
words. This spirit of music can be described to some extent through
poetry [Poesie]. The mere philosopher cannot get at it through his cold
abstractions and sharp analyses. But who can fathom at all the depths of
the imagination in whose obscurity the magic power of music is at work?
85 Robert Riggs, “‘On the Representation of Character in Music’: Christian Gottfried
Ko¨rner’s Aesthetics of Instrumental Music,” Musical Quarterly 81 (1997): 599–631.
86 Michaelis, “Ueber den Geist der Tonkunst, mit Ru¨cksicht auf Kants Kritik,” UGT, 8.
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At one moment music strides over the earth in fearful, gigantic steps; at
another it hurtles like a storm over the heaving sea; at yet another it
resounds in unearthly tones as if out of the catacombs, and convulses
the imagination with sublime images of tombs, the sleep of death and
resurrection. Think of Mozart’s Requiem!87
Hoffmann could scarcely have put it better. But the Requiem, of course,
is no instrumental work. As a wave of recent scholarship has begun to
show, neither Hoffmann nor his predecessors needed an exclusive pro-
motion of “absolute” instrumental music to satisfy their Romantic critical
priorities.88 These were indeed much more closely oriented toward
opera, Hoffmann’s own most intense field of musical creativity and one
he began to cultivate through the example and assistance of Reichardt—
a formative influence traced by Norbert Miller right through to Hoff-
mann’s mature aesthetics.89
Opera as Hoffmann imagined it did not belong on either side of the
vocal/instrumental divide: rather it would unite the most prized repre-
sentatives of each, the best Italian vocal music and the best of the Ger-
man instrumental tradition, in a thoroughly “impure” but effective
mixture of aesthetic strategies. As Emily Dolan has observed, even in his
descriptions of symphonies as the “opera of the instruments,” Hoffmann
“challenges our notion of a separation between instrumental and vocal
genres: Hoffmann still measured the symphony against vocal music.”90
87 “Ueber den Geist der Tonkunst” (1804), UGT, 201: “Neuerlich hat man die
Scho¨nheit als eine Darstellung des Unendlichen im Endlichen erkla¨rt, und eben dieses
Unendliche ist jenes wunderbare ho¨here Lebensprinzip, welches die wahre Seele aller
geistvollen Musik ausmacht, aber u¨ber Begriffe und Worte erhaben ist. Dieser Geist der
Musik la¨sst sich einigermassen durch Poesie schildern. Der blose Philosoph erreicht ihn
nicht durch seine kalten Abstraktionen und scharfen Zergliederungen. Wer ergru¨ndet
aber u¨berhaupt die Tiefen der Einbildungskraft, in deren Dunkel die Zaubermacht der
Tonkunst waltet? Bald schreitet die Musik, wie mit furchtbaren Riesenschritten einher;
bald brauset sie, wie ein Sturm u¨ber dem wogenden Meere; bald hallt sie in schauerlichen
To¨nen, wie aus den Katakomben hervor, und erschu¨ttert die Phantasie mit allen erhabe-
nen Bildern der Gra¨ber, des Todtenschlafs und der Auferstehung. Man denke an Mozarts
Requiem!”
88 Ulrich Tadday, “Zwischen Empfindung und Reflexion: Zur romantischen
Musika¨sthetik,” in Musika¨sthetik, ed. Helga de la Motte-Haber (Laaber: Laaber-Verlag,
2004), 201–19; Ha¨nggi, G. L. P. Sievers; Francien Markx, E. T. A. Hoffmann, Cosmopolitanism,
and the Struggle for German Opera (Leiden: Brill, 2016); and Matthew Riley, “E. T. A. Hoff-
mann beyond the ‘Paradigm Shift’: Music and Irony in the Novellas 1815–19,” inWords and
Notes in the Long Nineteenth Century, ed. Phyllis Weliver and Katharine Ellis (Woodbridge:
Boydell, 2013), 119–43.
89 Norbert Miller, “E. T. A. Hoffmann und die Musik I: Die Lehrjahre des reisenden
Enthusiasten,” in Europa¨ische Romantik in der Musik, ed. Carl Dahlhaus and Norbert Miller
(Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 2007), 2:55–150, esp. 89–123. Francien Markx notes that “in his
musical writings Hoffmann tended to agree with Reichardt for the most part” (E. T. A
Hoffmann, 86).
90 Emily Dolan, “Haydn, Hoffmann, and the Opera of Instruments,” Studia Musico-
logica 51 (2010): 344.
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To circle back to this article’s introduction, what we regard as the
“greatest” music of the period around 1800 was not necessarily the prin-
cipal goal or subject of the era’s music aesthetics—and where it was
prized, it was often for idiosyncratic reasons. In Kant’s musical legacy,
there still lies much to challenge and surprise us. Pace Taruskin, if we
think we “know the drill,” we are wrong.
ABSTRACT
This essay argues that musicological interpretations of Immanuel
Kant’s music aesthetics tend to misread his stance as a defense of artistic
formalism and autonomy—traits that, although present in his account of
music, in fact reinforce his peculiarly low estimate of music’s value among
the fine arts. Kant’s position and its subsequent influence can be grasped
more securely by analyzing his dichotomy between “free” and
“dependent” beauty. Through an exploration of this opposition’s echoes
and applications in the thought of three “Kantian” music critics and
aestheticians in the two decades after the appearance of the Critique of
Judgement—J. F. Reichardt, an anonymous series of articles commonly
attributed to J. K. F. Triest, and C. F. Michaelis—this essay argues that
Kantian aesthetics as applied in practice involved close attention to the
impact of genre, style, function, and compositional aims on the relevant
standards of judgment for an individual musical work. The result was not
one-sided support for the aesthetic or metaphysical “truth” of absolute
music, but a characteristic balance between the claims of “pure” and
“applied” art forms—a balance that continued to be maintained in the
transition from classical to Romantic aesthetics in the first decade of the
nineteenth century.
Keywords: Immanuel Kant, C. F. Michaelis, J. F. Reichardt, music
aesthetics, autonomy, formalism, classicism
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